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PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES
The pertinent statutes and rules cited in this Reply have
previously been set out in the Appellant's Brief.
REPLY TO EMPIRE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE"
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company (hereinafter "Weyerhaeuser")
objects to the "Statement of the Case" as set forth by Empire
Land Title, Inc., aka Empire Title Company (hereinafter "Empire") , insofar as the "Statement of the Case" fails to provide
proper cites to the record as is required by Rule 24(e) of the
Utah Court of Appeals and by Rule 8(b) of the Content requirements set forth in this Court's Checklist for Briefs.

This

failure to cite facts is important, because Empire misstates
several facts which could be relevant to this appeal.

The fol-

lowing facts as set forth in Empire's brief are either incorrect
or present erroneous implications:
a.

"At the time of sale and attempted assumption, and

prior thereto, the property in question was occupied by a tenant
of the Scotts named Papworth."
record for this alleged fact.

There is no citation to the

Furthermore, the unstated impli-

cation of this asserted fact - that Mr. Wilson did not have
control over Mr. Papworth - is in contravention of the evidence
which established that the closing on the property took place
on or about September 13, 1982, that Mr. Wilson's possession of
the property was not interfered with through his discovery of
the title problems approximately two and one-half years later
and the property was not regained by Weyerhaeuser until a demand
iii

by Weyerhaeuser in May, 1985 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24;
plaintiff's exhibit 4; defendant's exhibit 14; Transcript of
Trial, pp. 73 and 76).
b.

"Prior to the attempted assumption Wey€>rhaeuser had

foreclosed and sold the property in question under the terms of
its deed of trust with Scott."

The erroneous implication con-

tained herein is that Weyerhaeuser was aware of this previous
foreclosure.

This is not, in fact, the case, as both parties

were mistaken as to this fact (Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24).
c.

"As a result of this foreclosure, Weyerhaeuser held

all title to the property in question..."

Again, there is no

citation to the record, and this matter was not established.
Mr. Wilson had possession of the property from approximately
September 13, 1982 through May, 1985 and Mr. Wilson received a
Warranty Deed from Sondra Scott dated September 10, 1982 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24; Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76;
defendant's exhibit 5) (A true and correct copy of the Warranty
Deed from Sondra Scott to Kelly Wilson, Exhibit 5 below, is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A").
d.

"Some time after the attempted closing, Empire was

contacted by attorneys for Wilson demanding substantial damages."

Approximately 32 months elapsed between the time of the

closing on September 13, 1982 and the settlement between the
Wilsons, Empire and Empire's errors and omissions carrier, Shand
Morahan & Company on April 16, 1985 (plaintiff's exhibit 5;
Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5 and 6).
iv

POINT I
TWO NEW POINTS RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN EMPIRE'S BRIEF SHOULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.
Empire's brief raises two issues for the first time on
appeal, neither of which can or should be considered by this
Court.

Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986); Bundy v.

Century Equip. Co. , Inc. . 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Trayner
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).

This rule is true

with respect to defenses as well as affirmative issues. Rosenlof
v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah 1984); Banaerter v. Poulton,
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).
First, Empire contends for the first time on appeal, in
Point I and Point VI of Empire's brief, that it is entitled,
of its own right, to its claims against Weyerhaeuser.

This

issue was not asserted at trial (at which time Empire was pursuing its claims as the assignee of Kelly Wilson) .

See Memo-

randum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, R. 34-37 (In which
Empire responded to Weyerhaeuserfs Motion to Dismiss by contending its standing as the real party in interest arose by virtue
of an assignment from Kelly Wilson).

Minute Entry, R. 39 (Court

denies motion to dismiss, basing denial on assignment from Kelly
Wilson).

Likewise, the defenses raised in Points V and VI deal-

ing with the collateral source rule were never raised at trial
and should not be considered by this Court.

1

Furthermore, even if the Court considers the issue respecting Empire's own right to bring this action, the theory must
fail.

Empire makes reference to "its check" and asserts that

the check was "drawn by it" to support its contention that,
regardless of the source of the funds, it is entitled to their
recovery.

This argument, of course, is untenable, as it ignores

the real party in interest requirements and the safeguards afforded the parties thereby.

Empire in effect conceded this

fact in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (R.
34-37).

See Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be pro-

secuted in the name of the real party in interest") ; see also
Lvnch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P. 2d 464 (Utah 1959)
(Holding, in accordance with the "general rule", that the assignee was the real party in interest in pursuit of an action,
to assure that available defenses could be assetrted against
assignee); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Associates Transports,
Inc., 512 P.2d 137, 140 (Okla. 1973) ("The real party in interest is the party legally entitled to the proceeds of a claim in
litigation.") (citations omitted). Evidence at trial established
that the money tendered by Empire to Weyerhaeuser was from Kelly
Wilson or another (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 14; Trial
Transcript, p. 33).

2

POINT II
EMPIRE'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
Empire attempts to assert in its brief that the "beneficiary statement" is sufficient to form a written obligation between the parties, upon which a six-year statute of limitations
can arise.

The cases cited by Empire, however, clearly estab-

lish that the beneficiary statement did not form the writing
required to bring about a six-year statute of limitation.
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471
(1938), and Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125, 499
P.2d 273 (1972), do not support the extension of the statute of
limitations to six years.

Both cases clearly establish that in

order for the obligation to be founded in writing it must "grow
out of the written instruments".

Bracklein at 476. The obliga-

tions which allegedly arose from the beneficiary statement respected Wilson's assumption of the deed of trust (Respondent's
Brief, pp. 3 and 9) .

As Empire has pointed out in its brief,

"The beneficiary statement, and the tendered check are the written offer and acceptance of that offer between the parties. The
offer and the check form the written agreement between Empire
and Weyerhaeuser."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 5).

That alleged

contract, however, for the assumption of the property, is not
the basis for the relief sought by Empire.

The relief sought

does not "grow out of the written instrument".

3

Bracklein at

476.

Neither Empire nor Mr. Wilson seek to have the assumption

agreement forced; rather, Empire seeks return of money paid at
the closing of that matter.1

Empire's cause of action arises

from an unjust enrichment theory or a theory of money paid by
mistake.
POINT III
EMPIRE'S ASSIGNOR HAD AN OBLIGATION TO
MAKE THE PAYMENTS ON THE TRUST DEED NOTE OR FOR
THE REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
Empire contends Kelly Wilson received nothing

from the

transaction, and thus Weyerhaeuser has no claim against him.
This ignores, however, that Mr. Wilson took possession of the
property as of approximately September 13, 1982, the date of
the closing

(plaintiff's exhibit

2; defendant's exhibit 5;

Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24), and that Weyerhaeuser took no
action to evict either Mr. Wilson nor his tenants, Papworths,
until May, 1985 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76). It also
ignores the offer, made by Empire and declined by Wilson, to
pursue a quiet title action to legally affirm Wilson's ownership
interest (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 24). Empire's brief
attempts to bootstrap Mr. Wilson's inaction in collecting rent

1

Empire, upon discovery of the mistake, offered to bring a
quiet title action to affirm and establish Kelly Wilson's ownership of the property. Kelly Wilson declined this offer and
elected to obtain money damages rather than an affirmance of
the contract (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 24).
4

into some sort of theory he had no interest in the property;
this is simply not supported by the facts.

The fact remains

that Mr. Wilson had the right to the use and enjoyment of the
property during all of this period of time, and that he could
have, at any time, demanded rent from Mr. Papworth or could
have demanded his ouster under the unlawful detainer provisions
of Utah law.

See generally Utah Code Ann. Chapter 78-36 (1987

and Supp. 1989).
Restatement of Contracts, Section 349, set forth at page
16 of Appellant's Brief, clearly supports Empire's obligation
to tender the benefits Mr. Wilson received under the property.
It is not an acceptable defense to the requirement of restitution that Mr. Wilson elected not to pursue his rights.
Empire's brief attempts to argue that, if the time of the
discovery of the previous sale were moved to a couple of days
after the attempted assumption, all would have been different.
However, this same logic clearly establishes the inequity of
Empire's position vis-a-vis the facts as they are, rather than
as Empire wishes them to have been. Kelly Wilson and his tenant
sat on the property for a period of two and one-half years (from
September 13, 1982 through May, 1985), without forwarding any
mortgage payments or the fair rental value of the property to
Weyerhaeuser.

The inequity of this situation is clear, and

5

precludes Empire from seeking its damages without providing a
corresponding offset.2
Empire's assertions that Kelly Wilson's performance was
excused by virtue of Weyerhaeuserfs breach are likewise without
merit.

Wilson's failure to pay the mortgage payments continued

for one and one-half years before the mistake was discovered
and brought to the attention of Weyerhaeuser
Trial, pp. 23-28; plaintiff's exhibit 4).

(Transcript of

Even assuming Wilson

had a right to cease payments upon discovery of the mistake, he
is still required to return to Weyerhaeuser the benefits he
received.

See Restatement of Contracts, Section 349.
POINT IV
EMPIRE FAILED TO JOIN THE REAL PARTIES
IN INTEREST IN THIS ACTION, AND OTHER
PARTIES NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION.

Empire asserts, in connection with the failure to join
real parties in interest and other persons necessary for just
adjudication, that Weyerhaeuser could have itself sued these
individuals.

That contention ignores, however, that Empire

2

Empire argues that Weyerhaeuser's litigation against Mr.
Papworth somehow excused its rights for an offset against Mr.
Wilson. Weyerhaeuser contended at trial (Transcript of Trial,
pp. 59-60) and still contends the reference to the other litigation is irrelevant to this proceeding, but, should it be considered, points out that Weyerhaeuser's efforts against Mr.
Papworth to collect any rent have not yet been successful, and
further points out that even the institution of those proceedings required a considerable expenditure . of time and effort.
Had Empire or its assignor met its obligation, that time and
effort would not have been necessary.
6

waited until beyond four years to bring its action and, as a
result, many of the claims Weyerhaeuser may have had against
others may have been barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1989).

Furthermore, it ignores the risks of inconsistent results when
related claims are brought before different courts, and ignores
those interests of "judicial economy and fairness to the parties
in litigation" which are espoused in the case of Kemp v. Murray,
680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984).

Empire's failure to have joined

these parties should bar the relief it seeks.
Regarding Empire's contention that the contributions of
Shand Morahan & Company are not of concern to Weyerhaeuser by
virtue of the collateral source rule, Weyerhaeuser reasserts
that this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal,
and thus should not be considered by the Court.
generally.

See Point I,

However, if the Court does deem it appropriate to

consider the collateral source rule, it must realize the collateral source rule provides only that "a wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by a
proof that the plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent collateral
source."

Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) (footnote

omitted) (emphasis added).

The collateral source rule applies

7

in instances where the claim giving rise to the obligation is
one in tort, rather than an obligation of this sort.

Id.3

If the collateral source rule were applied as broadly as
Empire seeks, the Court would have to abandon or significantly
change its real party in interest and several related doctrines.
Subrogation claims would, in all instances, expose parties to
risks of multiple liability for the same obligation.

Despite

Empire's contention, a right to claim subrogation exists for
Shand Morahan & Company with or without the inclusion of any
express agreement therefor.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606

P. 2d 1197 (Utah 1980) (Holding subrogation to be lfa creature of
equity", and affirming no need for contractual basis).
POINT V
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES "EXPENDED
IN COLLECTING" THE JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS.
Empire stipulated at trial that they were not pursuing
attorneys1

fees, that there was no contractual basis for an

award of attorneys1 fees; and that Weyerhaeuser's defenses were
valid and did not justify any statutory award of attorneys1
fees (Transcript of Trial, p. 99) . Now, however, Empire refuses
to withdraw an award in the judgment of "attorneys1 fees expended in collection of the judgment."

3

In support of its re-

Alternatively, as is set forth in Point II, if Empire was
pursuing a tort action against Weyerhaeuser, the statute of
limitations had run, and the action should have been dismissed.
8

fusal, Empire cites only to Circuit Court Administrative Rules
respecting default judgments.

Weyerhaeuser submits that such

Administrative Rules are intended to either deal only with cases
where an award is otherwise justified, or the Rules should be
stricken in light of the limitations repeatedly espoused by
this Court respecting awarding of attorneys1 fees.

Arnica Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
First and foremost, this Court can and should determine
that there was no written contract between the parties, and thus
that the applicable statutes of limitation bar Empire's claims.
Second, the primary thrust of Empire's brief - that Empire had
its own right to pursue the action, and that somehow the collateral source rule allows Empire to collect monies it did not
expend - flies against the face of clear justice.

This Court

can and should analyze the facts before it to determine that
Empire brought its claims solely on the basis of an assignment
from Kelly Wilson; that Kelly Wilson's claims were limited in
that Kelly Wilson owed obligations to Weyerhaeuser which were
not met; and that as a result no judgment should have been entered against Weyerhaeuser.
For these reasons, appellant requests that this Court reverse the Circuit Court's judgment below on any or all of the
grounds argued, and that this Court remand this case to the
Circuit Court for dismissal.
9

Respectfully submitted this
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